

Ag 3 R. M. BISSELL
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PEOPLE OF THE WEEK

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came to power in poverty-ridden Greece at the age of 48. His six years as Prime Minister have been the longest period of stable government in modern Greek history. Under him, the Greek economy has made important gains.

The Greek leader told a Washington audience his goal was to prove that a poor nation does not need a dictatorship in order to develop its economy—that "it is possible to seek prosperity in freedom and dignity."

BIRCH SOCIETY BACKER?

General Walker Is Under Fire

In faraway Frankfurt, Germany, Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker found himself the key figure in a growing U.S. political dispute. The General was relieved of command of the 24th Division pending an Army investigation, ordered by President Kennedy, of charges that he had used

his position to promote the ideas of the Birch Society among the troops. The Society, a semisecret organization regarded as having strong "right wing" views, has become highly controversial because of the opinions of some of its leaders and its tactics in anti-Communist campaigns.

Original charges against the General came from "The Overseas Weekly," a privately owned newspaper published for sale to U.S. troops in Europe. The General, in reply, called the paper "immoral, unscrupulous, corrupt and destructive." The dispute promptly reached Congress, where there were demands both for a court-martial of the General and investigation of the paper.

Being in the center of a controversy is not new to the 51-year-old West Pointer. Four years ago he commanded Army units sent to Little Rock to enforce court-ordered integration.

(What Mr. Kennedy said about the Birch Society, page 73.)

"INVASION" SUPERVISOR

Richard Bissell of the CIA

The man in charge of U.S. aid to the ill-fated "invasion" of Cuba by anti-Castro rebels has been identified by The New York "Times" as Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

Mr. Bissell, a 51-year-old native of Connecticut, is deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, dealing with "special operations." The newspaper, in a lengthy report on the project, named him as supervisor of "invasion" preparations that were begun during the Eisenhower Administration.

The CIA official is a former economics professor from Yale and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He joined the top-secret agency after serving the Truman Administration in executive posts handling foreign aid and foreign policy. Now, Mr. Bissell also serves on the President's "Tuesday group"—an informal panel of policy experts.

PRESIDENT'S PRESS SECRETARY VS. CRITICAL NEWSMEN



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Press Secretary Salinger

Presidential Press Secretary Pierre Salinger is a man with numerous critics.

Recently, charges that news has been "suppressed," or that the President's news conferences are mishandled have been flooding in—from a committee of editors, from fellow newsmen.

Mr. Salinger took on his critics April 20 at a Washington meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors. Far from suppressing news, he said, the Kennedy Administration believes "as much information as possible must be made available to the people."

Then, in a panel discussion, Mr. Salinger heard more criticism. Peter Lisagor of the Chicago "Daily News," said that the TV news conference reports are



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COPYRIGHT Reporters vie for Mr. Kennedy's attention; Mr. Salinger looks on.


... disorderly, disorganized, almost chaotic," and that newsmen were "little more than props in a show." Trying to gain recognition in the big auditorium, he complained, was turning newsmen into "hog callers." Mr. Lisagor added that "there must be a better way of handling" the sessions with the press.

Mr. Salinger's reply: Radio and television coverage of presidential news con-

ferences long for the "intimate" news conferences of yore are being "unrealistic."

Backing up Mr. Salinger was Max Freedman, correspondent for "The Guardian" of Manchester, England. He said newsmen must bear a large part of the blame for shortcomings of the conferences. He praised the President's answers as "incisive," termed the conferences "an essential and enduring branch of Govern-

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

A2963

Handwritten notes: "See 30 m. B. BISSELL, Jr."

1961

The black eye a small minority has given the labor movement affects all of us. A case in point is a recent statement by Senator McCLELLAN.

The McClellan hearings built up steam for the Landrum-Griffin law. This law put the clamps on the officials of dishonest unions. But it also put the clamps on honest unions. Thus, it hurts you and me.

This month, Senator McClellan demanded still more restrictive legislation. He claimed "stronger laws are needed in some areas to protect working people who are members of some unions."

Such may be the case. But we are sure antiunion employers and lawmakers will clap their hands in glee.

To paraphrase President Crowell's words, the Landrum-Griffin law does not differentiate between clean unions and corrupt ones.

We hope President Crowell is right in predicting that galloping in unions will decline in the next 2 years. However, we hope it doesn't take a new Landrum-Griffin law to do it.

Another remark by President Crowell is also worth repeating. Crowell predicted the recession will make more members turn out for union meetings. We agree that this is fine.

But, as Crowell pointed out, there are some unions whose leaders "have forgotten how to lead." And, in these unions, greater membership participation will cause trouble.

No union member or officer should forget that the union exists for the rank-and-file membership.

Both President Crowell and Executive Secretary Robert S. Ash stressed the importance of electing friends of labor. This applies to everything from the board of education to the President of the United States.

Alameda County's clean, vigorous labor movement has an outstanding record in this respect.

Many labor councils and federations give lip service to the fact that gains over the bargaining table can be lost through anti-labor ordinances, laws, and court rulings.

In Alameda County, we do something about it.

As a result, most of the county's legislators are friends of labor. Governor Brown and President Kennedy carried Alameda County by big margins.

The Cuban Affair

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. STEVEN B. DEROUNIAN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 1, 1961

Mr. DEROUNIAN. Mr. Speaker, here is a report on the Cuban fiasco, with the conclusions formed by Joseph Newman of the New York Herald Tribune. The article appeared in this morning's issue: SEARCH FOR THE GUILTY IN THE CUBAN AFFAIR: THIS IS ONE VENOM

(By Joseph Newman)

WASHINGTON, April 30.—President Kennedy's top foreign policy advisers, anxious to

The writer of this article—Joseph Newman—is the chief United Nations correspondent of the Herald Tribune, and was the author of this newspaper's recent series "Cuba—S.S.E.?" which exposed the extent to which Castro has allied himself with the Communists. Newman was the Herald Tribune's roving Latin America correspondent for several years and before that was stationed in Moscow.

protect the United States from worldwide condemnation, watered down the battle plan for the invasion of Cuba to the point where it was virtually doomed to failure from the outset.

This is one of the major conclusions that emerge from questioning of American and Cuban participants in the abortive scheme to bring down the pro-Communist regime of Fidel Castro. They were interviewed in the three principal centers of the invasion operation—New York, Miami and Washington.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk is scheduled to appear tomorrow at a closed-door hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Latin America to testify about the administration's handling of the Cuban invasion.

The committee also plans to hear Allen W. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Dulles originally was scheduled to testify tomorrow, but when it became known that Mr. Rusk would appear, the testimony of Mr. Dulles was put off "until a later time," possibly Tuesday.

The special investigation, now being undertaken by Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor at President Kennedy's request, is almost certain to reach this final conclusion: The military support provided by Washington was enough to compromise the United States in the eyes of the world, but it was too little to give the invading Cuban force a fair chance of overthrowing Castro.

The blame must fall in the first instance on the military-intelligence side (the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency) as well as on the foreign policy advisers. These two groups entered into a compromise between military needs and international political considerations. The compromise resulted in failure.

President Kennedy, in the last analysis, acceded to the compromise, and he authorized the operation, in its crippled form, to proceed against heavy odds.

The plan to invade Cuba with a relatively insignificant force of 1,400 Cuban exiles was based on two broad assumptions: (1) control of the air to secure a beachhead, and (2) snowballing support from the Cuban people, once the invading force could demonstrate that its foothold was secure and that it was on the march.

These two prerequisites for success were severely impaired by restrictions insisted on by three of President Kennedy's chief foreign policy advisers—Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Under Secretary Chester Bowles, and Adlai E. Stevenson, American Ambassador to the United Nations.

Other key advisers—McGeorge Bundy, Walter W. Rostow, and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.—apparently went along with these restrictions.

WHAT LACK OF AIR COVER MEANT

The circumstances are reliably reported to have been as follows:

The Cuban expeditionary force had a small fleet of cargo planes and B-26 bombers. It had no fighter protection for this fleet as for the beachhead, once established. President Kennedy refused to provide air cover, available from nearby Florida bases or from an American aircraft carrier which was cruising in the Caribbean.

In the absence of air cover, the only alternative on which the invasion plan could proceed was the total destruction of Castro's small air force. Intelligence services estimated the force consisted of 30 aircraft, 12 B-26 bombers, 5 British-built Sea Fury propeller-driven fighters, and 9 T-28 jet fighter-trainers.

The surprise dawn attack on Castro's principal airfield on April 17, 1961, during the invasion force landed on the southern coast of Cuba, was intended to destroy the dictator's fighter-plane force. Seven Cuban pilots who carried out the raid with their B-26 bombers reported after returning to their secret airfield bases that the enemy

planes had been completely successful. They took aerial photographs to support their contention.

But photographs are not always conclusive evidence and the Strategic plan called for two more attacks on the Cuban airfields to provide absolute assurance that not a single one of Castro's fighter planes had survived to imperil the entire venture. These attacks by the B-26 bombers was to take place just before the dawn landings at Bahia de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs) on April 17.

They were vetoed by Rusk, Bowles, and Stevenson. The three men were alarmed by Castro's outcries following the first B-26 attack. Charges of aggression were leveled against the United States at a special meeting of the U.N. General Assembly only a few hours after the attack.

The three foreign policy advisers argued that additional attacks would make it impossible for them to uphold the official U.S. contention that this country was not a direct participant in the Cuban attack, and to answer charges that the United States was committing acts of aggression in violation of the United Nations Charter and provisions of the Organization of American States.

For the same reason the three vetoed two other important provisions of the original invasion plan. These called for a direct radio appeal to Cubans to rebel against Castro and the showing of the island republic with leaflets calling on the Cuban people to rise up in revolt.

The radio appeal was to be made by Jose Miro Cardona, head of the Cuban revolutionary council, and the leaflets were to be dropped by the rebel bombers.

By prior arrangement with the leaders of the anti-Castro underground, in Cuba, these were to serve as the twin signals for nationwide sabotage and the beginning of an uprising.

When these signals failed to appear, the underground leaders assumed that something had gone wrong and they were immobilized by uncertainty. Before they could even establish what had happened, Castro, by wholesale arrests in all the key population centers, was able to disarm them.

Forbidden by Washington to transmit the prerecorded revolutionary call by Dr. Miro Cardona, radio SWAN, situated on an island off Honduras and used by the rebels for propaganda warfare against the Castro regime, hastily substituted a message that said: "Alert! Alert! Look well at the rainbow. This first will rise very soon."

But this and the rest of the message proved meaningless to the underground leaders in Cuba. If anything, it meant that something had gone awry.

Much has been written about the failure of the Cuban people to revolt in support of the anti-Castro forces. The fact of the matter is that the landing operation never reached a point where the Cuban masses was put to a real choice between Castro and his enemies.

Contrary to widespread reports, the first part of the landing operation went off pretty much as planned, with the unloading only slightly slower than scheduled and the approach of Castro's ground forces and guns slightly faster than expected.

CASTRO PLANS AFT

What speed dismay and the appearance of a hand of the surprise bomb had wiped out only two-thirds of the force. According to a rebel pilot who participated in the battle, five British-made Sea Furies and two American-made T-28s were survivors. These were enough to make the outcome of the contest and give Castro's stunning victory.

The fighters were able to prevent the rebel bombers from carrying out one of their principal missions: to destroy Castro's heavy anti-aircraft guns and artillery.